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1Chapter 1
Cloud Computing Basics
In this chapter we go through some basic concepts with the purpose of providing context 
for the discussions in the chapters that follow. Here, we review briefly the concept of the 
cloud as defined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the 
familiar terms of IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS under the SPI model. What is not often discussed is 
that the rise of cloud computing comes from strong historical motivations and addresses 
shortcomings of predecessor technologies such as grid computing, the standard enterprise 
three-tier architecture, or even the mainframe architecture of many decades ago.
From a security perspective, the main subjects for this book—perimeter and 
endpoint protection—were pivotal concepts in security strategies prior to the rise of 
cloud technology. Unfortunately these abstractions were inadequate to prevent recurrent 
exploits, such as leaks of customer credit card data, even before cloud technology 
became widespread in the industry. We’ll see in the next few pages that, unfortunately 
for this approach, along with the agility, scalability, and cost advantages of the cloud, 
the distributed nature of these third-party-provided services also introduced new risk 
factors. Within this scenario we would like to propose a more integrated approach to 
enterprise security, one that starts with server platforms in the data center and builds 
to the hypervisor operating system and applications that fall under the notion of trusted 
compute pools, covered in the chapters that follow.
Defining the Cloud
We will use the U.S. government’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
cloud framework for purposes of our discussions in the following chapters. This provides 
a convenient, broadly understood frame of reference, without our attempts to treat it 
as a definitive definition or to exclude other perspectives. These definitions are stated 
somewhat tersely in The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing1 and have been elaborated 
by the Cloud Security Alliance.2
1Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. NIST Special Publication 
800-145, September 2011.
2Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing, Cloud Security Alliance,  
rev. 2.1 (2009).
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The model consists of three main layers (see Figure 1-1), laid out in a top-down 
fashion: global essential characteristics that apply to all clouds, the service models by 
which cloud services are delivered, and how the services are instantiated in the form of 
deployment models. There is a reason for this structure that’s rooted in the historical 
evolution of computer and network architecture and in the application development and 
deployment models. Unfortunately most discussions of the cloud gloss over this aspect. 
We assume readers of this book are in a technology leadership role in their respective 
fields, and very likely are influential in the future direction of cloud security. Therefore, an 
understanding of the dynamics of technology evolution will be helpful for the readers in 
these strategic roles. For this purpose, the section that follows covers the historical context 
that led to the creation of the cloud.
Figure 1-1. NIST cloud computing definition
The Cloud’s Essential Characteristics
The main motivation behind the pervasive adoption of cloud use today is economic. 
Cloud technology allows taking a very expensive asset, such as a $200 million data center, 
and delivering its capabilities to individual users for a few dollars per month, or even 
for free, in some business models. This feat is achieved through resource pooling, which 
is essentially treating an asset like a server as a fungible resource; a resource-intensive 
application might take a whole server, or even a cluster of servers, whereas the needs of 
users with lighter demands can be packed as hundreds or even thousands to a server.
This dynamic range in the mapping of applications to servers has been achieved 
through virtualization technology. Every intervening technology and the organizations 
needed to run them represent overhead. However, the gains in efficiency are so large 
that this inherent overhead is rarely in question. With applications running on bare-
metal operating systems, it is not unusual to see load factors in the single digits. Cloud 
applications running on virtualized environments, however, typically run utilizations up 
to 60 to 80 percent, increasing the application yield of a server by several-fold.
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Cloud applications are inherently distributed, and hence they are necessarily 
delivered over a network. The largest applications may involve millions of users, and 
the conveyance method is usually the Internet. An example is media delivery through 
Netflix, using infrastructure from Amazon Web Services. Similarly, cloud applications are 
expected to have automated interfaces for setup and administration. This usually means 
they are accessible on demand through a self-service interface. This is usually the case, for 
instance, with email accounts through Google Gmail or Microsoft Outlook.com.
With the self-service model, it is imperative to establish methods for measuring 
service. This measuring includes guarantees of service provider performance, 
measurement of services delivered for billing purposes, and very important from the 
perspective of our discussion, measurement of security along multiple vectors. The 
management information exchanged between a service provider and consumers is 
defined as service metadata. This information may be facilitated by auxiliary services or 
metaservices.
The service provider needs to maintain a service pool large enough to address 
the needs of the largest customer during peak demand. The expectation is that, with 
a large customer base, most local peaks and valleys will cancel out. In order to get the 
same quality of service (QoS), an IT organization would need to size the equipment for 
expected peak demand, leading to inefficient use of capital. Under some circumstances, 
large providers can smooth out even regional peaks and valleys by coordinating their 
geographically disperse data centers, a luxury that mid-size businesses might not be able 
to afford.
The expectation for cloud users, then, is that compute, network, and data resources 
in the cloud should be provided on short order. This property is known as elasticity. For 
instance, virtual machines should be available on demand in seconds, or no more than 
minutes, compared to the normal physical server procurement process that could take 
anywhere from weeks to years.
At this point, we have covered the what question—namely, the essential 
characteristics of the cloud. The next section covers service models, which is essentially 
the how question.
The Cloud Service Models
The unit of delivery for cloud technology is a service. NIST defines three service models, 
affectionately known as the SPI model, for SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS, or, respectively, software, 
platform, and infrastructure services.
Under the SaaS service model, applications run at the service provider or delegate 
services under the service network paradigm described below. Users access their 
applications through a browser, thin client, or mobile device. Examples are Google Docs, 
Gmail, and MySAP.
PaaS refers to cloud-based application development environments, compilers, and 
tools. The cloud consumer does not see the hardware or network directly, but is able to 
determine the application configuration and the hosting environment configuration.
IaaS usually refers to cloud-based compute, network, and storage resources. These 
resources are generally understood to be virtualized. For simplicity, some providers may 
require running pre-configured or highly paravirtualized operating system images. This is 
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how a pool of physical hosts is able to support 500 or more virtual machines each. Some 
providers may provide additional guarantees—for instance, physical hosts shared with no 
one else or direct access to a physical host from a pool of hosts.
The bottom layer of the NIST framework addresses where cloud resources are 
deployed, which is covered in the next section.
The Cloud Deployment Models
The phrase cloud deployment models refers to the environment or placement of cloud 
services as deployed. The quintessential cloud is the multi-tenant public cloud, where 
the infrastructure is pooled and made available to all customers. Cloud customers 
don’t have a say in the selection of the physical host where their virtual machines land. 
This environment is prone to the well-known noisy and nosy neighbor problems, with 
multiple customers sharing a physical host.
The noisy neighbor problem might manifest when a customer’s demand on host 
resources impacts the performance experienced by another customer running on the 
same host; an application with a large memory footprint may cause the application from 
another customer to start paging and to run slowly. An application generating intense I/O 
traffic may starve another customer trying to use the same resource.
As for the nosy neighbor problem, the hypervisor enforces a high level of isolation 
between tenants through the virtual machine abstraction—much higher, for instance, 
than inter-process isolation within an operating system. However, there is no absolute 
proof that the walls between virtual machines belonging to unrelated customers are 
completely airtight. Service-level agreements for public clouds usually do not provide 
assurances against tenants sharing a physical host. Without a process to qualify tenants, 
a virtual machine running a sensitive financial application could end up sharing the 
host with an application that has malicious intent. To minimize the possibility of such 
breaches, customers with sensitive workloads will, as a matter of practice, decline to run 
them in public cloud environments, choosing instead to run them in corporate-owned 
infrastructure. These customers need to forfeit the benefits of the cloud, no matter how 
attractive they may seem.
As a partial remedy for the nosy neighbor problem, an entity may operate a cloud for 
exclusive use, whether deployed on premises or operated by a third party. These clouds 
are said to be private clouds. A variant is a community cloud, operated not by one entity 
but by more than one with shared affinities, whether corporate mission, security, policy, 
or compliance considerations, or a mix thereof.
The community cloud is the closest to the model under which a predecessor 
technology, grid computing, operated. A computing grid was operated by an affinity group. 
This environment was geared toward high-performance computing usages, emphasizing 
the allocation of multiple nodes—namely, computers or servers to run a job of limited 
duration—rather than an application running for indefinite time that might use a 
fractional server.
The broad adoption of the NIST definition for cloud computing allows cloud 
service providers and consumers alike to establish an initial set of expectations about 
management, security, and interoperability, as well as determine the value derived from 
use of cloud technology. The next section covers these aspects in more detail.
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The Cloud Value Proposition
The NIST service and deployment models—namely public, private, and hybrid—get realized 
through published APIs, whether open or proprietary. It is through these APIs that customers 
can elicit capabilities related to management, security, and interoperability for cloud 
computing. The APIs get developed through diverse industry efforts, including the Open 
Cloud Computing Interface Working Group, Amazon EC2 API, VMware’s DMTF-submitted 
vCloud API, Rackspace API, and GoGrid’s API, to name just a few. In particular, open, 
standard APIs will play a key role in cloud portability, federation, and interoperability, as 
will common container formats such as the DMTF’s Open Virtualization Format or OVF, as 
specified by the Cloud Security Alliance in the citation above.
Future flexibility, security, and mobility of the resultant solution, as well as its 
collaborative capabilities, are first-order considerations in the design of cloud-based 
solutions. As a rule of thumb, de-perimeterized solutions have the potential to be more 
effective than perimeterized solutions relying on the notion of an enterprise perimeter to 
be protected, especially in cloud-based environments that have no clear notion of inside 
or outside. The reasons are complex. Some are discussed in the section “New Enterprise 
Security Boundaries,” later in this chapter. Careful consideration should also be given to 
the choice between proprietary and open solutions, for similar reasons.
The NIST definition emphasizes the flexibility and convenience of the cloud, 
enabling customers to take advantage of computing resources and applications that they 
do not own for advancing their strategic objectives. It also emphasizes the supporting 
technological infrastructure, considered an element of the IT supply chain managed to 
respond to new capacity and technological service demands without the need to acquire 
or expand in-house complex infrastructures.
Understanding the dependencies and relationships between the cloud computing 
deployment and the service models is critical for assessing cloud security risks and 
controls. With PaaS and SaaS built on top of IaaS, as described in the NIST model above, 
inherited or imported capabilities introduce security issues and risks. In all cloud models, 
the risk profile for data and security changes is an essential factor in deciding which 
models are appropriate for an organization. The speed of adoption depends on how fast 
security and trust in the new cloud models can be established.
Cloud resources can be created, moved, migrated, and multiplied in real time to 
meet enterprise computing needs. A trusted cloud can be an application accessible 
through the Web or a server provisioned as available when needed. It can involve a 
specific set of users accessing it from a specific device on the Internet. The cloud model 
delivers convenient, on-demand access to shared pools of hardware and infrastructure, 
made possible by sophisticated automation, provisioning, and virtualization 
technologies. This model decouples data and software from the servers, networks, and 
storage systems. It makes for flexible, convenient, and cost-effective alternatives to 
owning and operating an organization’s own servers, storage, networks, and software.
However, it also blurs many of the traditional, physical boundaries that help define 
and protect an organization’s data assets. As cloud- and software-defined infrastructure 
becomes the new standard, the security that depends on static elements like hardware, 
fixed network perimeters, and physical location won’t be guaranteed. Enterprises seeking 
the benefits of cloud-based infrastructure delivery need commensurate security and 
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compliance. Covering this topic is the objective for this book. The new perimeter is 
defined in terms of data, its location, and the cloud resources processing it, given that the 
old definition of on-premise assets no longer applies.
Let’s now explore some of the historical drivers of the adoption of cloud technology.
Historical Context
Is it possible to attain levels of service in terms of security, reliability, and performance 
for cloud-based applications that rival implementations using corporate-owned 
infrastructure? Today it is challenging not only to achieve this goal but also to measure 
that success except in a very general sense. For example, consider doing a cost rollup at 
the end of a fiscal year. There’s no capability today to establish operational metrics and 
service introspection. A goal for security in the cloud, therefore, is not to just match this 
baseline but to surpass it. In this book, we’d like to claim that is possible.
Cloud technology enables the disaggregation of compute, network, and storage 
resources in a data center into pools of resources, as well as the partitioning and  
re-aggregation of these resources according to the needs of consumers down the supply 
chain. These capabilities are delivered through a network, as explained earlier in the 
chapter. A virtualization layer may be used to smooth out the hardware heterogeneity and 
enable configurable software-defined data centers that can deliver a service at a quality 
level that is consistent with a pre-agreed SLA.
The vision for enterprise IT is to be able to run varied workloads on a software-defined 
data center, with ability for developers, operators, or in fact, any responsible entity to use 
self-service unified management tools and automation software. The software-defined 
data center must be abstracted from, but still make best use of, physical infrastructure 
capability, capacity, and level of resource consumption across multiple data centers and 
geographies. For this vision to be realized, it is necessary that enterprise IT have products, 
tools, and technologies to provision, monitor, remediate, and report on the service level 
of the software-defined data center and the underlying physical infrastructure.
Traditional Three-Tier Architecture
The three-tier architecture shown in Figure 1-2 is well established in data centers 
today for application deployment. It is highly scalable, whereby each of the tiers can be 
expanded independently by adding more servers to remove choke points as needed, and 
without resorting to a forklift upgrade.
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Figure 1-2. Three-tier application architecture
While the traditional three-tier architecture did fine in the scalability department, it 
was not efficient in terms of cost and asset utilization, however. This was because of the 
reality of procuring a physical asset. If new procurement needs to go through a budgetary 
cycle, the planning horizon can be anywhere from six months to two years. Meanwhile, 
capacity needs to be sized for the expected peak demand, plus a generous allowance 
for demand growth over the system’s planning and lifecycle, which may or may not 
be realized. This defensive practice leads to chronically low utilization rates, typically 
in the 5 to 15 percent range. Managing infrastructure in this overprovisioned manner 
represents a sunk investment, with a large portion of the capacity not used during most 
of the infrastructure’s planned lifetime. The need for overprovisioning would be greatly 
alleviated if supply could somehow be matched with demand in terms of near-real 
time—perhaps on a daily or even an hourly basis.
Server consolidation was a technique adopted in data centers starting in the early 
2000s, which addressed the low-utilization problem using virtualization technology to 
pack applications into fewer physical hosts. While server consolidation was successful at 
increasing utilization, it brought significant technical complexity and was a static scheme, 
as resource allocation was done only at planning or deployment time. That is, server 
consolidation technology offered limited flexibility in changing the machine allocations 
during operations, after an application was launched. Altering the resource mix required 
significant retooling and application downtime.
Software Evolution: From Stovepipes to Service Networks
The low cost of commodity servers made it easy to launch application instances. 
However, little thought was given to how the different applications would interact with 
one another. For instance, the information about the employee roster in an organization 
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is needed for applications as diverse as human resources, internal phone directory, 
expense reporting, and so on. Having separate copies of these resources meant allocating 
infrastructure to run these copies, and running an infrastructure was costly in terms of 
extra software licensing fees. Having several copies of the same data also introduced the 
problem of keeping data synchronized across the different copies.
Note ■  Cloud computing has multiplied the initial gains in efficiency delivered by server 
consolidation by allowing dynamic rebalancing of workloads at run time, not just at planning 
or deployment time.
The initial state of IT applications circa 2000 ran in stovepipes, shown in Figure 1-3 
on the left, with each application running on assigned hardware. Under cloud computing, 
capabilities common across multiple stacks, such as the company’s employee database, 
are abstracted out in the form of a service or of a limited number of service instances that 
would certainly be smaller than the number of application instances. All applications 
needing access to the employee database, for instance, get connected to the employee 
database service.
Figure 1-3. Transition from stovepipes to a service network ecosystem
Under these circumstances, duplicated stacks characterizing stovepiped applications 
now morph into a graph, with each node representing a coalesced capability. The 
capability is implemented as a reusable service. The abstract connectivity of the service 
components making up an application can be represented as a network—a service 
network. The stovepipes, thus, have morphed into service networks, as depicted on the 
right side of Figure 1-3. We call these nodes servicelets; they are service components 
designed primarily to be building blocks for cloud-based applications, but they are not 
necessarily self-contained applications.
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Figure 1-4. Application service networks
With that said, we have an emerging service ecosystem with composite applications 
that are freely using both internally and third-party servicelets. A strong driver for this 
application architecture has been the consumerization of IT and the need to make 
existing corporate applications available through mobile devices.
For instance, front-end services have gone through a notable evolution, whereby 
the traditional PC web access has been augmented to enable application access 
through mobile devices. A number of enterprises have opened applications for public 
access, including travel reservation systems, supply chain, and shopping networks. The 
capabilities are accessible to third-party developers through API managers that make it 
relatively easy to build mobile front ends to cloud capabilities; this is shown in Figure 1-4.  
A less elegant version of this scheme is the “lipstick on a pig” approach of retooling 
a traditional three-tier application and slapping a REST API on top, to “servitize” the 
application and make it accessible as a component for integration into other third-party 
applications. As technology evolves, we can expect more elegantly architected servicelets 
built from the ground up to function as such.
So, in Figure 1-4 we see a composite application with an internal API built out of 
four on-premise services hosted in an on-premise private cloud, the boundary marked 
by the large, rounded rectangle. The application uses four additional services offered by 
third-party providers and possibly hosted in a public cloud. A fifth service, shown in the 
lower right corner, uses a third-party private cloud, possibly shared with other corporate 
applications from the same company.
Continuing on the upper left corner of Figure 1-4, note the laptop representing a 
client front end for access by nomadic employees. The mobile device on the lower left 
represents a mobile app developed by a third-party ISV accessing another application API 
posted through an API manager. An example of such an application could be a company’s 
e-commerce application. The mobile app users are the company’s customers, able to 
check stock and place purchase orders. However, API calls for inventory restocking and 
visibility into the supply chain are available only through the internal API. Quietly, behind 
the scenes, the security mechanisms to be discussed in the following chapters are acting 
to ensure the integrity of the transactions throughout.
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In this section we have covered the evolution of application architecture from 
application stovepipes to the current service paradigm. IT processes have been evolving 
along with the architecture. Process evolution is the subject of the next section.
The Cloud as the New Way of Doing IT
The cloud represents a milestone in technology maturity for the way IT services are 
delivered. This has been a common pattern, with more sophisticated technologies taking 
the place of earlier ones. The automobile industry is a fitting example. At the dawn of the 
industry, the thinking was to replace horses with the internal combustion engine. There 
was little realization then of the real changes to come, including a remaking the energy 
supply chain based on petroleum and the profound ripple effects on our transportation 
systems. Likewise, servicelets will become more than server replacements; they will 
be key components for building new IT capabilities unlimited by underlying physical 
resources.
Note ■  An important consideration is that the cloud needs to be seen beyond just a  
drop-in replacement for the old stovepipes. This strategy of using new technology to  
re-implement existing processes would probably work, but can deliver only incremental 
benefits, if any at all. The cloud represents a fundamental change in how iT gets done and 
delivered. Therefore, it also presents an opportunity for making a clean break with the 
past, bringing with it the potential for a quantum jump in asset utilization and, as we hope 
to show in this book, in greater security.
Here are some considerations:
•	 Application development time scales are compressing, yet the 
scope of these applications keeps expanding, with new user 
communities being brought in. IT organizations need to be ready 
to use applications and servicelets from which to easily build 
customized applications in a fraction of the time it takes today. 
Unfortunately, the assets constituting these applications will 
be owned by a slew of third parties: the provider may be a SaaS 
provider using a deployment assembled by a systems integrator; 
the systems integrator will use offerings from different software 
vendors; IaaS providers will include network, computing, and 
storage resources.
CHAPTER 1 ■ Cloud ComPuTing BAsiCs
11
•	 A high degree of operational transparency is required to build 
a composite application out of servicelets—that is, in terms of 
application quantitative monitoring and control capability.  
A composite application built from servicelets must offer  
end-to-end service assurance better than the same application 
built from traditional, corporate-owned assets. The composite 
application needs to be more reliable and secure than incumbent 
alternatives if it’s to be accepted. Specific to security, operational 
transparency means it can be used as a building block for 
auditable IT processes, an essential security requirement.
•	 QoS constitutes an ever-present concern and a barrier; today’s 
service offerings do not come even close to reaching this goal, 
and that limits the migration of a sizable portion of corporate 
applications to cloud. We can look at security as one of the most 
important QoS issues for applications, on a par with performance.
On the last point, virtually all service offerings available today are not only opaque 
when it comes to providing quantifiable QoS but, when it comes to QoS providers, they 
also seem to run in the opposite direction of customer desires and interests. Typical 
messsages, including those from large, well-known service providers, have such 
unabashed clauses as the following:
“Your access to and use of the services may be suspended . . . 
for any reason . . .”
“We will not be liable for direct, indirect or consequential 
damages . . .”
“The service offerings are provided ‘as is’ . . . ”
“We shall not be responsible for any service interruptions . . . ”
These customer agreements are written from the perspective of the service provider. 
The implicit message is that the customer comes as second priority, and the goal of 
the disclaimers is to protect the provider from liability. Clearly, there are supply gaps 
in capabilities and unmet customer needs with the current service offerings. Providers 
addressing the issue head on, with an improved ability to quantify their security risks and 
the capability of providing risk metrics for their service products, will have an advantage 
over their competition, even if their products are no more reliable than comparable 
offerings. We hope the trusted cloud methods discussed in the following chapters will 
help providers deliver a higher level of assurance in differentiated service offerings. We’d 
like to think that these disclaimers reflect service providers’ inability, considering the 
current state of the art, to deliver the level of security and performance needed, rather 
than any attempts to dodge the issue.
Given that most enterprise applications run on servers installed in data centers, the 
first step is to take advantage of the sensors and features already available in the server 
platforms. The next chapters will show how, through the use of Intel Trusted Execution 
Technology (TXT) and geolocation sensors, it is possible to build more secure platforms.
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We believe that the adoption, deployment, and application of the emerging 
technologies covered in this book will help the industry address current quandaries with 
service-level agreements (SLAs) and enable new market entrants. Addressing security 
represents a baby step toward cloud service assurance. There is significant work taking place 
in other areas, including application performance and power management, which will 
provide a trove of material for future books.
Security as a Service
What would be a practical approach to handling security in a composite application 
environment? Should it be baked-in—namely, every service component handling its own 
security—or should it be bolted on after integration? As explained above, we call these 
service components servicelets, designed primarily to function as application building 
blocks rather than as full-fledged, self-contained applications.
Unfortunately, neither approach constitutes a workable solution. A baked-in 
approach requires the servicelet to anticipate every possible circumstance for every 
customer during the product’s lifetime. This comprehensive approach may be overkill 
for most applications. It certainly burdens with overwrought security features the service 
developer trying to quickly bring a lightweight product to market. The developer may see 
this effort as a distraction from the main business. Likewise, a bolted-on approach makes 
it difficult both to retrofit security on the servicelet and to implement consistent security 
policies across the enterprise.
One possible approach out of this maze is to look at security as a horizontal 
capability, to be handled as another service. This approach assumes the notion of a 
virtual enterprise service boundary.
New Enterprise Security Boundaries
The notion of a security perimeter for the enterprise is essential for setting up a first line 
of defense. The perimeter defines the notion of what is inside and what is outside the 
enterprise. Although insider attacks can’t be ruled out, let’s assume for the moment that 
we’re dealing with a first line of defense to protect the “inside” from outsider attacks. 
In the halcyon days, the inside coincided with a company’s physical assets. A common 
approach was to lay out a firewall to protect unauthorized access between the trusted 
inside and untrusted outside networks.
Ideally, a firewall can provide centralized control across distributed assets with 
uniform and consistent policies. Unfortunately, these halcyon days actually never existed. 
Here’s why:
A firewall only stands a chance of stopping threats that attempt to •	
cross the boundary.
Large companies, and even smaller companies after a merger •	
and acquisition, have or end up having a geographically disperse 
IT infrastructure. This makes it difficult to set up single-network 
entry points and it stretches the notion of what “inside” means.







Figure 1-5. Traditional security perimeter
The possibility of composite application with externalized •	
solution components literally turns the concept of “inside” 
inside out. In an increasingly cloud-oriented world, composite 
applications are becoming the rule more than the exception.
Mobile applications have become an integral part of corporate IT. •	
In the mobile world, certain corporate applications get exposed to 
third-party consumers, so it’s not just matter of considering what 
to do with external components supporting internal applications; 
also, internal applications become external from the application-
consumer perspective.
The new enterprise security perimeter has different manifestations depending on the  
type of cloud architecture in use—namely, whether private, hybrid, or public under the 
NIST classification.
The private cloud model is generally the starting point for many enterprises, as they 
try to reduce data center costs by using a virtualized pooled infrastructure. The physical 
infrastructure is entirely on the company’s premises; the enterprise security perimeter is 
the same as for the traditional, vertically owned infrastructure, as shown in Figure 1-5.
























Figure 1-7. Generalized cloud security perimeter
The next step in sophistication is the hybrid cloud, shown in Figure 1-6. A hybrid 
cloud constitutes the more common example of an enterprise using an external cloud 
service in a targeted manner for a specific business need. This model is hybrid because the 
core business services are left in the enterprise perimeter, and some set of cloud services 
are selectively used for achieving specific business goals. There is additional complexity, in 
that we have third-party servicelets physically outside the traditional enterprise perimeter.
The last stage of sophistication comes with the use of public clouds, shown in 
Figure 1-7. Using public clouds brings greater rewards for the adoption of cloud 
technology, but also greater risks. In its pure form, unlike the hybrid cloud scenario, 
the initial on-premise business core may become vanishingly small. Only end users 
remain in the original perimeter. All enterprise services may get offloaded to external 
cloud providers on a strategic and permanent basis. Application components become 
externalized, physically and logically.
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Yet another layer of complexity is the realization that the enterprise security 
perimeter as demarcation for an IT fortress was never a realistic concept. For instance, 
allowing employee access to the corporate network through VPN is tantamount to 
extending a bubble of the internal network to the worker in the field. However, in 
practical situations, that perimeter must be semipermeable, allowing a bidirectional flow 
of information.
A case in point is a company’s website. An initial goal may have been to provide 
customers with product support information. Beyond that, a CIO might be asked to 
integrate the website into the company’s revenue model. Examples might include  
supply-chain integration: airlines making their scheduling and reservation systems, 
or hotel chains publishing available rooms, not only for direct consumption through 
browsers but also as APIs for integration with other applications. Any of these extended 
capabilities will have the effect of blurring the security boundaries by bringing in external 
players and entities.
Note ■  An iT organization developing an application is not exclusively a servicelet 
consumer but also is making the company become a servicelet provider in the pursuit of 
incremental revenue. The enterprise security boundary becomes an entity enforcing the 
rules for information flow in order to prevent a free-for-all, including corporate secrets flying 
out the window.
If anything, the fundamental security concerns that existed with IT delivered out of 
corporate-owned assets also apply when IT functions, processes, and capabilities migrate 
to the cloud. The biggest challenge is to define, devise, and carry out these concepts 
into the new cloud-federated environment in a way that is more or less transparent to 
the community of users. An added challenge is that, because of the broader reach of the 
cloud, the community of users expands by several orders of magnitude. A classic example 
is the airline reservation system, such as the AMR Sabre passenger reservation system, 
later spun out as an independent company. Initially it was the purview of corporate staff. 
Travel agents in need of information or making reservations phoned to access the airline 
information indirectly. Eventually travel agents were able to query and make reservations 
directly. Under the self-service model of the cloud today, it is customary for consumers 
to make reservations themselves through dozens of cloud-based composite applications 
using web-enabled interfaces from personal computers and mobile devices.
Indeed, security imperatives have not changed in the brave new world of cloud 
computing. Perimeter management was an early attempt at security management, and it 
is still in use today. The cloud brings new challenges, though, such as the nosy neighbor 
problem mentioned earlier. To get started in the cloud environments, the concept of 
trust in a federated environment needs to be generalized. The old concept of inside vs. 
outside the firewall has long been obsolete and provides little comfort. On the one hand, 
the federated nature of the cloud brings the challenge of ensuring trust across logically 
and geographically distributed components. On the other hand, we believe that the goal 
for security in the cloud is to match current levels of security in the enterprise, preferably 
by removing some of the outstanding challenges. For instance, the service abstraction 
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used internally provides additional opportunities for checks and balances in terms of 
governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) not possible in earlier monolithic 
environments.
We see this transition as an opportunity to raise the bar, as is expected when any 
new technology displaces the incumbent. Two internal solution components may 
trust each other, and therefore their security relationships are said to be implicit. If 
these components become servicelets, the implicit relationship becomes explicit: 
authentication needs to happen and trust needs to be measured. If these actions can’t be 
formalized, though, the provider does not deliver what the customer wants. The natural 
response from the provider is to put liability-limiting clauses in place of an SLA. Yet there 
is trouble when the state-of-the-art can’t provide what the customer wants. This inability 
by service providers to deliver security assurances leads to the brazen disclaimers 
mentioned above.
Significant progress has been achieved in service performance management. Making 
these contractual relationships explicit in turn makes it possible to deliver predictable 
cost and performance in ways that were not possible before. This dynamic introduces the 
notion of service metadata, described in Chapter 10. We believe security is about to cross 
the same threshold. As we’ve mentioned, this is the journey we are about to embark on 
during the next few chapters.
The transition from a corporate-owned infrastructure to a cloud technology poses 
a many-layered challenge: every new layer addressed then brings a fresh one to the fore. 
Today we are well past the initial technology viability objections, and hence the challenge 
du jour is security, with security cited as a main roadblock on the way to cloud adoption.
A Roadmap for Security in the Cloud
Now that we have covered the fundamentals of cloud technology and expressed some 
lingering security issues, as well as the dynamics that led to the creation of the cloud, we 
can start charting the emerging technology elements and see how they can be integrated 
in a way that can enhance security outcomes. From a security perspective, there are 
two necessary conditions for the cloud to be accepted as a mainstream medium for 
application deployment. We covered the first: essentially embracing its federated nature 
and using it to advantage. The second is having an infrastructure that directly supports 
the security concerns inherent in the cloud, offering an infrastructure that can be trusted. 
In Chapter 2, we go one level deeper, exploring the notion of “trusted cloud.” The trusted 
cloud infrastructure is not just about specific features. It also encompasses processes 
such as governance, assurance, compliance, and audits.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the notions of trusted infrastructure and trusted 
distributed resources under the umbrella of trusted compute pools and enforcement of 
security policies steming from a hardware-based root of trust. Chapter 4 deals with the 
idea of attestation, an essential operational capability allowing the authentication of 
computational resources.
In a federated environment, location may be transparent. In other cases, because 
of the distributed nature of the infrastructure, location needs to be explicit: policies 
prescribing where data sets and virtual machine can travel, as well as useful ex post facto 
audit trails. The topic of geolocation and geotagging is covered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 
surveys security considerations for the network infrastructure that links cloud resources. 
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Chapter 7 considers issues of identity management in the cloud. And Chapter 8 discusses 
the idea of identity in a federated environment. The latter is not a new problem; federated 
identity management was an important feature of the cloud’s predecessor technology, 
grid computing. However, as we’ll show, considerations of federation for the cloud are 
much different.
Summary
We started this chapter with a set of commonly understood concepts. We also observed 
the evolution of security as IT made of corporate-owned assets to that of augmented with 
externalized resources. The security model also evolved from an implicit, essentially 
“security by obscurity” approach involving internal assets to one that is explicit across 
assets crossing corporate boundaries. This federation brings new challenges, but it also 
has the possibility of raising the bar in terms of security for corporate applications. This 
new beginning can be built upon a foundation of trusted cloud infrastructure, which is 
discussed in the rest of this book.
